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There has been considerable consolidation in the hospital industry in recent years. Over
900 deals occurred from 1994-2000, and many local markets, even in large urban areas, have
been reduced to monopolies, duopolies, or triopolies. This surge in consolidation has led to
concern about competition in local markets for hospital services. We examine the e®ect of
market structure on competition in local hospital markets { speci¯cally, does the hardness
of competition increase with the number of ¯rms? We extend the entry model developed by
Bresnahan and Reiss to make use of quantity information, and apply it to data on the U.S.
hospital industry. In the hospital markets we examine, entry leads to a quick convergence
to competitive conduct. Entry reduces variable pro¯ts and increases quantity. Most of the
e®ects of entry come from having a second and a third ¯rm enter the market. The fourth
entrant has little estimated e®ect. The use of quantity information allows us to infer that
entry is consumer-surplus-increasing.1 Introduction
Throughout the United States, consolidation in the hospital industry is altering the local
market structure for hospital services. During the second half of the 1990s, a wave of hospital
consolidation occurred in the United States. One source puts the total number of hospital
mergers from 1994-2000 at over 900 deals (Jaklevic, 2002, and www.levinassociates.com),
on a base of approximately 6,100 hospitals. Many of these mergers have occurred in small
markets, thereby resulting in merger to monopoly. Even some large urban markets such as
Boston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco are now dominated by two to three large hospital
systems. Not surprisingly, many health plans have complained about rising prices as a result
of these consolidations (Lesser and Ginsburg, 2001).
This surge in consolidation activity has led to concern about the e®ects of this consolida-
tion on competition in local markets for hospital services. The federal antitrust enforcement
agencies have brought challenges in a number of cases against hospitals seeking to merge.
The courts, however, have ruled against the antitrust enforcement agencies on every hospital
merger case tried in the last decade (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000).
There have been a number of studies which have examined the relationship between
hospital market structure and performance (e.g., Dranove et al., 1993; Connor et al., 1998;
Krishnan, 2001; Dranove and Ludwick, 1999). The vast majority of these studies ¯nd a
positive association between concentration and price or price-cost margins.1 There have also
been a smaller number of studies which examine the relationship between concentration and
hospital quality or service o®erings (e.g., Dranove et al., 1992; Kessler and McClellan, 2000;
Volpp and Waldfogel, 2000). There is no clear pattern in the results of these studies: some
¯nd that concentration is associated with lower quality, while others do not.
1For exceptions see Lynk (1995); Lynk and Neumann (1999).
1While these studies have proved very valuable by uncovering consistent patterns in the
data, they are subject to the usual criticism that it is very hard to know if \Structure-
Conduct-Performance" (SCP) studies identify competition (Schmalensee, 1989; Bresnahan,
1989; Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) have developed a method for
examining the e®ect of market structure on competition that is not subject to the problems
associated with the SCP approach. The Bresnahan and Reiss (BR) method uses a simple,
general entry condition to model market structure. The intuition is that if the population
(per-¯rm) required to support a given number of ¯rms in a market grows with the number
of ¯rms then competition must be getting tougher, thereby shrinking pro¯t margins and
requiring a larger population to generate the variable pro¯ts necessary to cover entry costs.
Thus, the key data for this method are market structure and population, which are commonly
available and accurately measured.
In particular, the BR method does not require data on price-cost margins or on prices.
The former are commonly considered to be subject to biased measurement. As in many
industries, buyers (insurers) in the hospital industry are able to negotiate discounts from list
prices (called charges), and, although list prices are commonly observable, transaction prices
are not.2
In this paper we augment the BR approach to incorporate the use of quantity data and
apply it to local markets for hospital services. This augmented approach takes advantage of
the additional information contained in quantity, without imposing restrictions signi¯cantly
beyond those implied by the original approach. Further, it allows for qualitative welfare
inference. If quantity increases with entry, consumers are better o®. If the entry of an
additional ¯rm is not accompanied by any increase in quantity, however, then it cannot be
2An alternative approach to the BR method which avoids the problems associated with SCP is structural
modeling of demand and price setting by ¯rms (Bresnahan, 1989; Berry et al., 1998). This approach requires
more assumptions to put the necessary structure on the problem. It also does not readily lend itself to an
examination of the relation between market structure and competition.
2social welfare enhancing, since it carries with it additional ¯xed costs (Berry and Waldfogel,
1999; Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). Our approach allows us to test for whether entry
bene¯ts consumers or is purely wasteful.3 This approach extends the empirical literature in
industrial organization on evaluating the determinants and e®ects of entry4 by adding to the
relatively scarce empirical evidence and proposing a simple extension of the BR method for
industries that possess good quantity data.
The results from our estimation are striking. In the hospital markets we examine, entry
toughens competition very quickly. Indeed, most of the e®ects of entry come from having a
second and a third ¯rm enter the market. The entry of a fourth has relatively little additional
e®ect. Further, quantity is increasing in the number of ¯rms, implying that entry is bene¯cial
to consumers.
Two recent papers are related to ours. In a closely related paper estimating entry into
US broadcast radio markets, Berry and Waldfogel (1999) also extend the BR approach. In
addition to data on market structure, Berry and Waldfogel employ data on market shares
and on prices. This allows them to make inferences about the e±ciency of free entry in the
radio broadcasting industry. Our approach is similar to that of Berry and Waldfogel in that
we also use data on quantity to augment the BR approach. We do not, however, use data on
prices, for the reasons given above. This means that our ability to make welfare inferences
is more limited.
Genesove (2004) is another recent paper on entry. Genesove examines possible explana-
tions for the striking reduction in the number of cities in the U.S. with at least two daily
newspapers. In particular, he uses an interesting implementation of the BR approach to
3We cannot test for socially ine±cient entry in general. That requires evaluating the bene¯ts of increased
quantity from entry against the ¯xed costs. To do so would require the use of price data { precisely what
we are trying to avoid.
4See, for example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991); Berry (1992); Berry and Waldfogel (1999); Scott Morton
(1999); Davis (2002).
3make inferences about the toughness of competition. Genesove also eschews demand esti-
mation and looks at quantity in some of his analyses, but this is complementary to his entry
estimates, as opposed to estimating a joint model of market structure and quantity.
We also share in common with both Berry and Waldfogel (1999) and Genesove (2004) an
analysis of industries where the product market is local (radio, newspapers, and hospital care
are all locally produced and consumed) and the product is di®erentiated. Like these authors,
and earlier work, we use the assumption that ¯rms are symmetric, so that post-entry pro¯ts
depend only on the number of ¯rms in the market and on market level characteristics. To
fully relax this assumption we would need to allow hospitals to choose their characteristics.
While it is possible to use the methods pioneered by Mazzeo (2002) to model entry into
di®erentiated products markets, these methods require a discrete measure of di®erentiation
(e.g. discretely measured motel quality , as in Mazzeo). Hospitals are di®erentiated in multi-
ple and complex ways, thus this industry does not lend itself to the use of these methods. An
alternative would be fully to model demand, including pricing and characteristic choice. This
would be contrary to the goal of our paper, however, which is to see how much we can learn
about competition using a simple model which has relatively minimal data requirements.
We conduct some auxiliary analyses to examine our assumptions and discuss in detail the
implications of product di®erentiation for the interpretation of our results in Section 5.
We lay out the model and econometrics in Section 2. Section 3 contains a description of
the data. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains a discussion
of the inferences that can be drawn from the results, and Section 6 contains the summary
and conclusions.
42 Model and Econometrics
The model below is based on the entry model of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). Their model
uses the concept of entry thresholds | the market sizes necessary to support successive
entrants to a market | to infer how the toughness of competition varies with market struc-
ture. We integrate an analysis of the quantity transacted in the market with their framework,
permitting a sharper inference of the e®ects of structure on competition.
2.1 Demand and Costs
For this analysis, we take the output of hospital production to be a single product which
is the composite of the set of all hospital services. Since most hospitals sell a common
bundle of services (e.g., most hospitals o®er obstetrics, surgery, emergency care, etc.), this
assumption does capture an important aspect of institutional reality.5 Further, because of
the importance of joint costs in the hospital industry, it is not clear that it is possible to
analyze entry for individual services in a meaningful way.6
Let market demand for hospital services be:
Q = d(P;X) ¢ S(Y ): (1)
Market demand is the product of per capita demand (the demand of a representative
consumer, d(¢)) and the total market size, S(Y ). Per capita demand is a®ected by price, P
and exogenous demand shifters such as demographic factors and health insurance coverage,
5The majority of buyers of hospital services are managed care insurance plans, which purchase a bundle
of hospital services for their enrollees. This assumption is nearly universally used in economic and antitrust
analyses of the hospital industry (see Dranove and White, 1994; Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000; Gaynor
and Vogt, 2000).
6For some work along these lines, however, see Dranove et al. (1992).
5X. We presume that consumers, or health insurers acting as their agents, care about the
price of hospital services. There is ample evidence on this point (Manning et al., 1987;
Feldman and Dowd, 1986). Demographic factors (e.g., age) are known to a®ect the demand
for hospital care, as is income. The market size, S, is an increasing function of population
and other variables, Y .
For simplicity, we assume that hospital costs are characterized by a constant average
variable cost, AV C(W), and a ¯xed (or sunk) cost, F(W) depending upon cost-shifters,
W.7
2.2 Equilibrium
Following BR, we assume a symmetric equilibrium in price is reached in each market. For a
market with N ¯rms, we will denote the equilibrium value PN. Price depends upon demand
and cost conditions as well as the toughness of competition, represented here by µN:8
PN = P(X;W;µN) (2)
In most static oligopoly models, variables which shift up market demand or reduce the
elasticity at least weakly raise prices, as do variables which shift up marginal costs. Thus,
we expect PN to be rising in those elements of X and W which increase demand and costs,
respectively. The equilibrium value of P induces equilibrium values of quantity, ¯xed costs,
and variable pro¯ts:
7The assumption of constant average variable costs is not restrictive. Inferences from this model regarding
conduct are unchanged even with U-shaped average costs (see Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991, 1988).
8Tougher competition with more competitors is a robust prediction of theoretical oligopoly models (Sut-
ton, 1991; Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991).
6dN = d(PN;X) (3)
FN = F(W;N) (4)
VN = PN ¡ AV C(W) (5)
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), we also allow ¯xed costs to depend directly on
N. Generally, this dependence can re°ect the existence of a scarce resource like a desirable
location or a pool of entrepreneurs with heterogeneous geographic preferences, so that the
¯xed costs of entry may be higher for later entrants. In the case of the hospital industry, we
think the assumption that later entrants have higher ¯xed costs re°ects a hospital's need to
build a cadre of referring physicians. The ¯rst entrant need not expend many resources on
this task, as it is the only hospital to which physicians can refer. Later entrants anticipate
expending resources to convince referring physicians to a±liate with them rather than with
a competitor.
2.3 Entry
A hospital will enter a local market if it can earn non-negative pro¯ts. The Nth ¯rm in a
market earns pro¯ts equal to:
¦N = (PN ¡ AV CN)
S
N
dN ¡ FN (6)
The minimum market size necessary to support N ¯rms in the market, SN, is derived by






(PN ¡ AV CN)dN
(7)
7The per-¯rm entry threshold for N ¯rms, sN, is the ratio of equilibrium ¯xed costs to
the product of equilibrium variable pro¯ts and equilibrium per-capita demand. Following
Bresnahan and Reiss, we examine ratios of entry thresholds to measure the rate at which






(PN ¡ AV CN)




The entry threshold ratio, sN+1=sN, measures the product of two things: the change in
¯xed costs as N increases and the change in per-capita variable pro¯ts as N increases. The
change in variable pro¯ts may be further decomposed into the change in per-capita quantity
transacted and average variable pro¯t. If competition is becoming tougher with entry,
dN+1
dN
should be greater than one and
PN+1¡AV CN+1
PN¡AV CN less than one.
Ignoring for the moment the potential for changing ¯xed costs, a threshold ratio of
one represents an unchanging level of competition, while a threshold ratio greater than one
represents an increase in the toughness of competition. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) interpret
a ratio sN+1=sN & 1 as N ! 1 as most naturally re°ecting a market converging to the
(unchanging) competitive equilibrium as the number of ¯rms increases.
As equation 8 makes clear, the entry threshold ratios alone cannot separately identify
the e®ect of entry on the toughness of price competition and the e®ect of entry on ¯xed
costs. Our addition to the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) framework is the use of information
on quantity transacted separately to identify the quantity e®ect, dN+1=dN.
2.4 Econometrics
We observe the number of ¯rms (N) and quantity (Q) for each market, so we seek equations




SdNVN ¡ FN (9)
QN = SdN (10)
Recall, however, that market size, S, is a function of population, Y . Per-capita demand,
dN, and variable pro¯ts, VN, are functions of equilibrium price, PN. Equilibrium price is
a function of demand shifters, X, cost shifters, W, and the toughness of competition, µN.
However, we do not observe P or µ. We therefore express dN, VN, and FN as reduced form
functions of the observables X and W. We capture µN, how the toughness of competition
changes with the number of ¯rms, °exibly and non-parametrically via a set of indicators of
the number of ¯rms in the market.
We specify market size, S, per-capita quantity, dN, average variable pro¯t, VN, and ¯xed
costs of entry, FN, as:
S = exp(Y ¸ + ²S) (11)
dN = exp(X±X + W±W + ±N + ²d) (12)
VN = exp(X®X + W®W ¡ ®N + ²V) (13)
FN = exp(W°W + °N + ²F) (14)
The parameters ±N, ®N, and °N are coe±cients on dummy variables for market structure.
They capture di®erences in per-capita quantity, average variable pro¯t, and ¯xed costs among
markets with one ¯rm and markets with N ¯rms. For example, a positive value for °2
indicates that the ¯xed cost of entry for the second ¯rm is greater than the ¯xed cost of
entry for the ¯rst. A value of °3 > °2 similarly indicates that the ¯xed cost of entry for the
9third ¯rm is greater than the ¯xed cost of entry for the second, and so on. Similarly, positive
and increasing (in N) values of ±N (±2;±3;:::) indicate per-capita quantity increasing with
entry, and positive and increasing values of ®N (®2;®3;:::) indicate average variable pro¯ts
falling with entry.
Note that Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) use a di®erent speci¯cation for S, d, and V . They
specify S and d ¢ V as linear functions of covariates, S = Y ¸ and d ¢ V = X®X + W®W. We
favor our logarithmic speci¯cation since it facilitates a clear discussion of identi¯cation (see
the next section, 2.4.1).9






Y ¸ + X (±X + ®X) + W (±W + ®W)
+±N ¡ ®N ¡ lnN + ²S + ²d + ²V
1
C
A ¡ exp(W°W + °N + ²F)





Y ¸ + X (±X + ®X) + W (±W + ®W)
+±N ¡ ®N ¡ lnN + ²S + ²d + ²V
1
C
A > exp(W°W + °N + ²F)
i.e., as
Y ¸ + X (±X + ®X) + W (±W + ®W ¡ °W)
+ ±N ¡ ®N ¡ °N ¡ lnN + ²S + ²d + ²V ¡ ²F > 0
(15)
Denote ¹N = ®N + °N + lnN ¡ ±N and ¹X = ±X + ®X, with ¹W similarly de¯ned and
9As a check we also estimated a linear version of the model. The results were very similar. We do not
report them here, but they are available on request.
10also denoting ²¦ as the sum of the error terms above. Employing the fact that the number
of ¯rms in the market will be maxfN : ¦N > 0g, we see that:
N =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
0 if Y ¸ + X¹X + W¹W + ²¦< ¹1
1 if ¹1 <Y ¸ + X¹X + W¹W + ²¦< ¹2
2 if ¹2 <Y ¸ + X¹X + W¹W + ²¦< ¹3
3 if ¹3 <Y ¸ + X¹X + W¹W + ²¦< ¹4
4+ if ¹4 <Y ¸ + X¹X + W¹W + ²¦
(16)
Note that if ²¦ has a normal distribution, then the entry model is a standard ordered
probit with threshold values given by the ¹N.
Substituting (11) and (12) into (10), we obtain the quantity equation:
lnQN = Y ¸ + X±X + W±W + ±N + ²S + ²d (17)
The relevant quantity for purposes of the entry equation is some measure of expected long
run quantity. However, we observe quantity at a single point in time for each market, thus
this likely measures long run quantity with error. We therefore add a term for measurement
error, de¯ning ²Q = ²S + ²d + ², yielding:
lnQN = Y ¸ + X±X + W±W + ±N + ²Q (18)
The quantity equation cannot be estimated by OLS for two reasons. First, Q is unob-
servable for N = 0. This would not be a problem if the selection of markets for which N = 0
were random, but it is not. Looking at the entry equation, whether N = 0 is determined in
part by ²S and ²d. Hence there would be selection bias in estimating equation 18 by OLS.
11Second, and for similar reasons, the number of ¯rms in the market, N, is endogenous to ²S
and ²d. This means that the market structure dummies, of which the ±N are the coe±cients,
are endogenous.
2.4.1 Identi¯cation
Observe that from the entry equation alone, (15), it is possible to identify only (±X + ®X),
(±W + ®W ¡ °W), and (±N ¡ ®N ¡ °N). Changes in (±N ¡ ®N ¡ °N) with N control the
behavior of the population threshold ratios as N increases.
If market population is an element of Y , and it is entered in logs with a coe±cient of

























The expression in equation 19 demonstrates that the per-¯rm population thresholds de-
pend on how (±N ¡ ®N ¡ °N) changes with N. Equation 20 echos the expression in equa-
tion 8, showing that changes in ¯xed costs, variable pro¯ts, and per-capita demand are not
identi¯ed separately in the entry equation alone. In Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), °N and
±N ¡ ®N are separately identi¯ed only because of the imposition of the linear functional
form.10 That is, any pattern of threshold ratios is consistent with any pattern of ±N and
dN, since °N can be adjusted to make any pattern of threshold ratios consistent with any
pattern of ±N and ®N.
The additional identi¯cation achieved by including a quantity equation is revealed by
10We claim no originality for this insight, as a close reading of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) reveals that
those authors are aware of as much.
12examining equations 15 and 18. From the quantity equation we are able to identify ±N, ±X,
and ±W. Therefore, from the quantity and entry equations, we are able separately to identify
±N, ±X, ±W, (®N + °N), (®W + °W), and ®X.
By using outside information, we may be able to go further in identifying the parameters
of this model. Suppose we know the market elasticity of demand, ´d, in the relevant industry
and we know the average pro¯t margin,
PN¡AV CN
PN , for some N. Then, we know that the
percent price decline due to the entry of the (N + 1)th ¯rm is
±N+1¡±N
´d . The percent change
in PN ¡ AV CN due to a 1 percent change in PN is:
@ (PN ¡ AV CN)
@PN
PN
PN ¡ AV CN
= 1 ¢
PN





Thus, we know ®N+1 ¡ ®N, the decline in average variable pro¯t from the entry of the




PN¡AV CN. Given the normalizations ±1 = ®1 = 0, this gives us
all the ®N and thus all the °N.11
2.4.2 Distributional Assumptions and Likelihood
The two equations we wish to estimate are an ordered-probit entry equation and a linked
demand equation which has both selection bias and endogeneity of the market structure
dummies:
Y ¸ + X (±X + ®X) + W (±W + ®W ¡ °W)
+ ±N ¡ ®N ¡ °N ¡ lnN + ²¦ > 0
(15)
11Obviously, this reasoning depends in an important way on three assumptions: that there are no scale
economies, that the only demand-relevant variable which changes upon entry is price, and that average
variable costs do not change with entry, as, e.g. a valuable local input's price is bid up.
13lnQN = Y ¸ + X±X + W±W + ±N + ²Q (18)
The error terms in these two equations are sure to be correlated because they have in
common the terms ²S and ²d. They are not perfectly correlated, however, because ²Q contains
the measurement error term ² which is absent from ²¦, and because ²¦ contains the cost and
average variable pro¯t error terms, ²F and ²V, which do not appear in the demand equation.
In addition, there is reason to believe that ²d (in both equations) and ²V (in the entry
equation only) are negatively correlated. The toughness of price competition, µN, may vary
across markets. In markets with tough price competition, price will be lower, inducing both
higher quantity and lower average variable pro¯ts, hence a negative correlation between ²d
and ²V.
The nature of the endogeneity and selection in the quantity equation is now clear. In
markets which have high demand unobservables, ²S and ²d, observed quantity is higher than it
would otherwise be from the direct e®ect of the demand errors on the quantity equation, and
the number of ¯rms is also higher than it would otherwise be, via the e®ect of the demand
errors on the entry equation. Since this correlation does not come from the competitive
e®ect we are trying to measure with ±N, it will bias the estimation of ±N, making the e®ect
of competition on quantity look larger than it is in fact. Conversely, the endogeneity coming
from µN will tend to understate the competitive e®ects. High quantity will correlate with low
N because markets with tough competition will have fewer ¯rms and lower prices. Which
of these e®ects dominates is an empirical matter.
This leads to a slightly non-standard selection model. The entry equation is the selection
equation. It selects whether or not we see Q (we do not see Q if N = 0). It then selects which
number of ¯rms we will see in each market and therefore which ±N we will be estimating in
the quantity equation for each market. Selection models like this one may be consistently
14estimated via maximum likelihood given a distributional assumption on the errors.
To re°ect the correlation between the error terms in the two equations, we use a variance
components model:
²¦ = º¦ + r´ (21)
²Q = ºQ + ´ (22)
We assume that º¦ and ºQ are independent normals with mean zero and variances ¾2
º¦
and ¾2
ºQ, respectively.12 We also assume that the random variable ´ is independent of º¦
and ºQ and that it has a mean of zero.
The dependence in the errors between the two is modeled via the common random vari-
able ´ and the parameter r. If r > 0, then the entry equation and quantity equation errors
are positively correlated and if r < 0, then they are negatively correlated. Since the per-
capita demand and the market size errors appear in both the entry and quantity equation
with the same sign, we expect that r > 0.
With some additional assumptions, we can sharpen the interpretive power of r. Assume
that both ²S and ²F are independent of ²d and ²V. In this case, ´ is modeling the correlation
between ²d and ²d + ²V. Were ²V and ²d to be uncorrelated, we would see r = 1. If, on
the other hand, ²d and ²V were to be positively correlated, then we would see r > 1, and
if they are negatively correlated, r < 1. Now, ²d and ²V would be positively correlated if
variations in ´ were picking up mostly variation in demand conditions with an unchanging
toughness of price competition. High demand markets, holding all else constant, should have
(at least weakly) higher average variable pro¯ts (holding constant the number of ¯rms). On
12Since the entry equation is an ordered probit, one might think that the variance of º¦ is not identi¯ed.
In our model, however, it is because ¸ is identi¯ed from equation 18, so that no normalization is necessary
in equation 15.
15the other hand, ²d and ²V would be negatively correlated if variations in ´ were picking up
variations in the toughness of competition. In hard competition markets, quantity would be
higher and average variable pro¯ts lower owing to the lower price. So, under these additional
assumptions, we can interpret r > 1 as indicating signi¯cant unobserved variation in demand
and r < 1 indicating signi¯cant unobserved variation in the hardness of price competition
among markets. Of course, both things could be occurring, in which case comparing r to
one only tells us which e®ect is dominant.
Because ºQ, º¦, and ´ are mutually independent, ²¦ and ²Q are independent once we
condition on ´. Consider now the contribution (conditional on ´) to the likelihood function
of a market with N = 0:
P fN = 0j´g =P fY ¸ + X¹X + W¹W + ²¦ < ¹1j´g
P fN = 0j´g =P fY ¸ + X¹X + W¹W + º¦ + r´ < ¹1j´g
P fN = 0j´g =©(¹1 ¡ Y ¸ ¡ X¹X ¡ W¹W ¡ r´)
The contribution (conditional on ´) to the likelihood function of a market with N = n
is:




©(¹n+1 ¡ Y ¸ ¡ X¹X ¡ W¹W ¡ r´)






lnQ ¡ Y ¸ ¡ X±X ¡ W±W ¡ ±N ¡ ´
¾ºQ
¶
Finally, the contribution (conditional on ´) to the likelihood function of a market with
N = n, where n is the \top" category in the ordered probit, is:
16P fN = nj´gf (lnQj´) = P f¹n < Y ¸ + X¹X + W¹W + º¦ + r´j´gf (lnQj´)





lnQ ¡ Y ¸ ¡ X±X ¡ W±W ¡ ±N ¡ ´
¾ºQ
¶
Now let us turn to ´. Let ´ be distributed with a distribution function F(´;¯) which
depends on parameters ¯. Then the contribution of an observation with N = n where n is
neither zero nor the top category would be:
Z
´
P fN = nj´gf (lnQj´)dF(´;¯) =
8




©(¹n+1 ¡ Y ¸ ¡ X¹X ¡ W¹W ¡ r´)










To arrive at the unconditional contribution to the likelihood function, we must integrate
over ´. Rather than assuming a particular functional form for the distribution of ´, we
choose to approximate this distribution using a discrete factor approximation (Heckman and
Singer, 1984; Mroz and Guilkey, 1992). This entails using a multinomial distribution for ´
with K points of support:
17´ =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
¯1 with probability p1
¯2 with probability p2




¯K with probability pK
The use of this distribution with K points of support introduces 2K additional parame-
ters, the K ¯s and the K ps. However, the requirement that the probabilities sum to one
and the requirement that the expected value of ´ be zero reduces the number of parameters
to 2(K ¡ 1).
At last, the unconditional contribution to the likelihood function of an observation with
N = n where n is neither zero nor the top category is:
Z






©(¹n+1 ¡ Y ¸ ¡ X¹X ¡ W¹W ¡ r¯k)






lnQ ¡ Y ¸ ¡ X±X ¡ W±W ¡ ±N ¡ ¯k
¾ºQ
¶
The contributions for observations with N = 0 and with N equal to the top category in
the ordered probit may be derived similarly. It is this likelihood function which we take to
the data. It remains to choose a K, and we follow the prior literature in that we increase K
until the likelihood function no longer rises appreciably with further increases in K. In our
case, raising K from six to seven resulted in the likelihood function rising by approximately
0.05, so we set K equal to seven.
18Both principled and pragmatic reasons recommend the discrete factor approximation as a
way of introducing correlation between two equations in an econometric model. Because the
discrete factor's distribution is parameterized in a way which is essentially non-parametric, it
can reduce the bias which would otherwise result from assuming normal errors where the er-
rors are not in fact normal. Monte Carlo simulations using discrete factor approximations in
selection models and simultaneous equations models have shown that discrete factor approx-
imations perform approximately as well as Normal maximum likelihood when the equation
errors are truly normal, and that discrete factor approximations provide good estimators of
underlying structural parameters in the presence of non-normality in the error terms (Mroz
and Guilkey, 1992; Mroz, 1999).
Pragmatically, the distributions of the error terms of each equation of the model condi-
tional upon the discrete factor, ´, are normal and independent of each other. This makes
both the analytical derivation of the likelihood function and the programming of the like-




The unit of analysis is a market for hospital services. Markets for hospital services are local,
owing to the nature of the service (Frech, 1987). There is no single, agreed upon method for
empirical market de¯nition, although it is clear that the markets should be \self-contained"
in the sense that there is not relevant competition from outside the market. We thus follow
Bresnahan and Reiss by focusing on geographically isolated markets as a way of minimizing
13For example, both Stata and TSP easily implement the model we consider in this paper, and we use
TSP for our estimates.
19the possibility of competition coming from outside the de¯ned market.
With that in mind, we de¯ne our markets using the following selection criteria. First,
we identi¯ed all cities and census designated places (CDPs) in the United States with pop-
ulations of at least 5,000, using the 1990 Census. Each of these we designate a potential
market. Second, to reduce the possibility of market overlap, we eliminate potential markets
that are within 50 miles of a city with a population of at least 100,000, or within 15 miles
of another potential market. Third, we eliminate all potential markets in which a hospital
was located outside of the city but within 15 miles. Finally, markets that were on Indian
reservations or located in Alaska or Hawaii were excluded from the analysis. Applying these
criteria, we identify 613 markets with 490 hospitals.
These markets contain 12.26 million people collectively, about 4.4 percent of the U.S.
population. The 490 hospitals represent about 9.1 percent of U.S. hospitals. In Table 1, we
compare the size distribution of the hospitals in our sample to the overall distribution of US
hospitals. As one might expect, given that our sample selection criteria exclude big cities, we
under-sample large hospitals. Furthermore, given that ignore places with population smaller
than 5,000, we also under-sample the very smallest hospitals. Markets like ours have been
disproportionately represented in antitrust cases. Three out of the 11 hospital merger cases
(27.3%) brought by the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies in the last twenty years were
against hospitals located in markets contained in our sample. A number of the other 11 cases
were also in similar markets with a very small number of hospitals, although they were not
in our analysis sample. Figure 1 contains a map illustrating the locations of these markets.
As a check of our market de¯nition, we include in our regressions the natural log of the
distance from a hospital market to the nearest city with a population of at least 100,000, the
natural log of the distance from a hospital market to the nearest city with a population of at
least 5,000, and the proportion of commuters traveling at least 45 minutes to work. These
variables should pick up \leakages" to or from nearby locations.
20We also note that geographic di®erentiation is one of the most important aspects of
product di®erentiation in this industry. A large literature (see Capps et al., 2003; Gaynor and
Vogt, 2003, 2000, and references therein) ¯nds that geographic di®erentiation is extremely
important in hospital demand, and that consumers strongly prefer hospitals close to their
homes. Our method of market de¯nition results in very small markets, thereby minimizing
the extent of geographic di®erentiation in the markets we analyze.
3.2 Data and Measures
3.2.1 Sources
We use data from a variety of sources, including the American Hospital Association (Amer-
ican Hospital Association, 1990), the 1990 U.S. Census, the Area Resource File (Bureau of
Health Professions, 1996), the InterStudy National HMO Census (InterStudy, 1990), and the
Missouri Certi¯cate of Need Program (Piper, 1998).
3.2.2 The Number of Firms, N
The number of ¯rms is de¯ned as the total number of short-term general hospitals with
50 or more beds in a local market. We eliminate any hospitals with fewer than 50 beds
on the grounds that they are not e®ectively full service hospitals. Military hospitals are
also excluded, since they do not serve the general public. We identi¯ed hospitals and their
location from the American Hospital Association (American Hospital Association, 1990).
Table 2 contains the distribution of hospital market structures and their average populations
in our sample.
213.2.3 Quantity, Q
The measure we use for quantity is total adjusted admissions in the market.14 These data
come from the American Hospital Association, which collects this information from all hos-
pitals in the U.S. on an annual basis (American Hospital Association, 1990). Adjusted
admissions allow for the fact that hospitals provide both inpatient and outpatient care by
creating a weighted average of the two, where the weight for inpatient admissions is 1 and
for outpatient visits is the ratio of outpatient charges per visit to inpatient charges per ad-
mission. There are other commonly used measures of hospital quantity, such as inpatient
admissions alone, inpatient hospital days, or hospital beds. We examined the correlations
between all pairs of these measures. Each correlation was greater than 0.9.
3.2.4 Market Size, S(Y)
Population, Y , is the key determinant of market size, S. We use data from the 1990 Census
on the population of the places that are markets in our sample. Population means by market
structure are contained in Table 2. The mean population size for the entire sample is 19,102.
Using population of the place may not accurately represent the total population of the
market if individuals living outside the place travel there to obtain hospital services. To
control for potential in°ows, we include a measure of the market fringe population, de¯ned
as the population located outside the place, but within 15 miles. In contrast, some residents
of the place may choose to travel outside of the local market to obtain hospital services. We
proxy for this potential out°ow by including the proportion of residents who commute more
than 45 minutes to work. Assuming this measure is correlated with residents' willingness to
travel to obtain care elsewhere, this should be associated with a decrease in the demand for
hospital services in the market.
14For short-term, general, non-military hospitals.
22Last, we include an indicator variable for whether the market has a military base. Since
military personnel may obtain health care from military facilities, demand may be lower in
an area with a military base than in an otherwise similar area without one.15
3.2.5 Demand Shifters, X
Referring back to equations (12) and (13), per capita demand, dN, and variable pro¯ts,
VN, are determined in part by exogenous demand shifters, X, such as demographic factors,
income, and insurance. Data for these variables come from the 1990 Area Resource File
(Bureau of Health Professions, 1996). The major demographic factor is age. The proportion
of the population 65 years of age and older in the market should be positively associated with
demand for hospital services. Illness increases with age, and thus demand for health care.
This population is also eligible to receive Medicare, thereby increasing insurance coverage
and hence demand. The measure of income we use is per capita income for the place's
population. This may not only capture the direct e®ects of income on demand, but the
extent of health insurance coverage in the population, since insurance coverage is positively
associated with income.
We also include the number of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) as a factor
a®ecting demand. HMOs have two e®ects on demand. First, HMOs attempt directly to
control the amount and type of health care use, speci¯cally focusing on keeping patients out
of the hospital, directly reducing demand for hospital services. Second, HMOs often contract
with a subset of hospitals in a market to provide services for their enrolled population, making
choices based in large part on price. This leads to hospitals facing more elastic demand for
their services. We use the number of HMOs operating in the county of the market in 1990
15Recall that military hospitals are excluded from the count of hospitals and from the measure of quantity.
23(InterStudy, 1990).16 The number of HMOs operating in a market is arguably endogenous,
but, in our application this variable is never signi¯cant, and excluding it does not a®ect our
results.
3.2.6 Cost Shifters, W
Both variable pro¯ts (13) and ¯xed costs (14) are a®ected by exogenous cost shifters, W.
Hospitals utilize various labor inputs in the provision of acute care. We use the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services' (CMS) hospital wage index as a measure of hospitals' labor
costs.17 We also include median gross rent, de¯ned to be the median rent paid by renter-
occupied housing units in the market, and CMS's area construction cost index to control
for di®erences across markets in facility or building costs.18 In addition to labor and facility
costs, hospitals may incur costs associated with regulatory compliance. The National Health
Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 mandated that states establish \certi¯cate
of need" (CON) programs (Joskow, 1980). These programs require hospitals and other health
care providers to obtain formal approval before making large capital investments, which
include the construction of new hospitals and expansion of existing facilities (Phelps, 1997).
Many but not all states have subsequently allowed their CON laws to lapse. We interpret
this regulation as a ¯xed cost that hospitals incur when choosing to enter a market. Our
binary measure for the presence of a certi¯cate of need program is CON.
Table 3 contains variable de¯nitions and descriptive statistics.
16We thank Doug Wholey for providing us with these data.
17This wage index was developed for the purposes of Medicare hospital payment. CMS is the U.S. gov-
ernment agency which runs Medicare.
18The CMS construction cost index was also developed for the purposes of Medicare hospital payment.
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We begin by reporting results for the entry and quantity equations estimated separately
as single equations (Table 4). These estimates are useful for comparing with the main
results obtained by estimating the entry and quantity equations jointly. Estimating the
entry equation as a single equation also corresponds to the method employed by Bresnahan
and Reiss, allowing us to compare the joint estimation results with those obtained with their
method.
Table 4 (second column) contains the estimates from the single equation entry model. To
generate these estimates, we regressed the number of ¯rms in a market on all of our market
size, demand, and cost shifters using ordered probit. This technique produces consistent
estimators of ± + ® ¡ ° and the threshold ratios as long as ²¦ is normal, since equation 16
describes an ordered probit model. This ordered probit model di®ers from Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) only in that we use a log-log rather than linear functional form for the com-
ponents of the pro¯t function. As is readily apparent, almost all of the coe±cients in this
table have the \right" sign. The demand and market size shifters raise the expected number
of ¯rms in the market, and the cost shifters reduce it. The coe±cients on construction cost
index and distance to a big city have statistically insigni¯cant coe±cients of the \wrong"
sign, and the coe±cient on military base has a large, signi¯cant coe±cient of the wrong sign.
We discuss the threshold ratios for this model below.
In the third column of Table 4 we report parameter estimates of the quantity equation
derived by estimating equation 18 by OLS using only the markets in which at least one
hospital is present. These estimates were generated by regressing the natural log of quan-
tity in each market on the market size shifters, demand shifters, and variable cost shifters,
along with a set of market structure dummies. As indicated previously, these estimates are
inconsistent both because there is selection bias caused by the unobservability of lnQ when
25no hospitals are present and because of the endogeneity of the market structure dummies.
We can correct the ¯rst of these problems by estimating a Heckman sample selection model.
Maximum likelihood estimates from such a model are reported in the fourth column of the
table. The ¯rst stage regression of the sample selection model included all the variables in
the table plus the certi¯cate of need variable and the construction cost index.19
For both of these models, many of the point estimates are again reasonable. The market
size and demand shifters largely increase the market quantity transacted and the cost shifters
largely reduce it. The market structure dummies also have the expected pattern. As more
hospitals enter, the quantity transacted in the market rises. Furthermore, the incremental
rise in demand with entry decreases as more ¯rms enter, consistent with competition be-
coming tougher but approaching the competitive level as N increases. By the fourth ¯rm,
demand is no longer rising appreciably in entry, and in the OLS estimation it even seems to
decline slightly (from 0.688 to 0.661). However, in both models the market structure dum-
mies have an implausibly large e®ect on the quantity transacted. In the selection model, for
example, a market with four ¯rms has an expected demand e0:661 = 1:94 times as large as
the same market would have with a single ¯rm. This is consistent with the market structure
dummies being endogenous | markets with high unobserved demand will also have many
¯rms because the high demand causes entry.
We now turn to the main results from our model. Table 5 contains the parameter
estimates from the maximum likelihood estimation of equations 15 and 18 with the discrete
factor approximation.20 The parameter estimates are organized according to whether the
variables enter the market size, per-capita demand, variable pro¯ts, or ¯xed cost branch of
19The ¯rst stage estimates are not reported here, but are available upon request.
20We also estimated the model suppressing the discrete factor approximation. Those estimates are reported
in the column labeled \No DFA." We discuss those estimates later.
26the entry model.21
The parameter estimates are largely reasonable. The coe±cient on population in the
market size branch of the model says that a 1% increase in market population raises the
level of demand by 0.83%. Similarly, an increase in fringe population of 1% raises quantity
by 0.21%. Thus, the e®ect of fringe population on demand is about 68% as large as is
the e®ect of market population on demand. Military bases appear to have a small and
insigni¯cant e®ect in this model.
In the per-capita quantity branch of the model, we are estimating ±, the e®ect of the
various covariates on equilibrium quantity transacted in the market. The cost shifters,
wages and rent, have the expected negative sign, although the parameters are imprecisely
estimated. Similarly, the demand shifters, income, commuters, and percentage elderly a®ect
per-capita quantity in the expected direction. The distance variables show some evidence
that our market de¯nition procedure was not completely successful in isolating truly self-
contained geographical markets. The coe±cient on distance to a big city is very small. With
respect to large cities, our markets seem far enough away that leakage is not an empirically
important phenomenon. For small cities, this is less true. The coe±cient on distance to a
small city shows that a 1% decrease in the distance to a small city decreases local quantity
by 0.22%. Markets with small cities closer to them have lower demand.
The market structure dummies show that quantity increases substantially with the entry
of the second ¯rm, more modestly with the entry of the third ¯rm and that it drops with the
entry of the fourth ¯rm. Expected demand with two ¯rms is e0:254 = 1:29 times as large as
it is with one ¯rm. Expected demand with three ¯rms is e0:415¡0:254 = 1:17 times as large as
with two ¯rms, and quantity is e0:297¡0:415 = 0:89 times as large with four or more ¯rms as
with three. However, because we have only ¯ve markets with four or more ¯rms and eight
21In performing this estimation, we expressed all of the right-hand-side variables in deviations from their
means. This a®ects only the estimates of the intercept parameters in each equation.
27markets with three ¯rms, the coe±cients on the three and four ¯rm market structures are
imprecisely estimated. For example, ±3 and ±4 are not signi¯cantly di®erent from one another
at conventional signi¯cance levels (t-stat=0.64), nor are ±2 and ±3 signi¯cantly di®erent from
one another at conventional signi¯cance levels (t-stat=1.25).
Recall that the coe±cients in the average variable pro¯ts branch of the model, ®, are
not separately identi¯ed from the coe±cients in the ¯xed cost branch of the model, °. Only
® ¡ ° is identi¯ed. However, for many of the variables we are interested in, identi¯cation
can be achieved via parameter restrictions. The next section of Table 5 contains variables
which are in X but not W: variables we are willing to assume shift demand but not cost.
Thus, the coe±cients in that part of the table estimate ®X. None of these coe±cients are
signi¯cant at conventional levels, but, at point estimates, most of them have either no e®ect
or an e®ect in the expected direction.
Similarly, an exclusion restriction allows us to identify the e®ects of certi¯cate of need
regulation and construction costs on ¯xed costs. To exclude these variables from ®, we
assume that they a®ect neither demand nor variable costs, which seems reasonable. As in the
variable pro¯ts branch of the model, these variables' coe±cients are imprecisely estimated.
Two of our cost variables plausibly a®ect both ¯xed and variable costs, wages and rent;
thus, we are able to identify only ° ¡ ®. Since we expect increases in these variables to
raise ¯xed costs and to lower variable pro¯ts (because they raise variable costs), we expect
° ¡ ® to be positive for both. As the results in the variable pro¯ts and ¯xed cost section of
Table 5 show, these expectations are borne out. Wages have an almost unit elasticity on the
ratio of variable pro¯ts to ¯xed costs and rent also has a positive if smaller and statistically
insigni¯cant estimated e®ect.
Finally, the e®ects of market structure on variable pro¯ts and ¯xed costs are not identi¯ed
separately. We can see only °N ¡ ®N, the percent increase in ¯xed costs plus the percent
decline in variable pro¯t relative to monopoly for each market structure. The results in the
28entry e®ects subsection of Table 5 show that the entry of the second ¯rm has a strong negative
e®ect on average variable pro¯ts net of ¯xed costs. The e®ects of subsequent entrants are
smaller, and, again, the point estimates indicate that the entry of the fourth ¯rm actually
decreases ¯xed costs net of average variable pro¯ts. However, as in the per-capita quantity
branch of the model, the di®erence in the e®ects of the third and fourth ¯rms is neither large
nor signi¯cant at conventional levels (t-stat=0.51). Here, however, the t-stat for the e®ect
of the third ¯rm is signi¯cant at conventional levels (t-stat=3.14).
The estimates of the parameters of the discrete factor approximation appear next in
Table 5. Since our discrete factor approximation had seven points of support, we have
fourteen parameters: the seven values ´ can take on, the ¯s, and the seven probabilities
associated with these seven values, the ps. Of course, in a sense there are only really twelve
parameters, as the probabilities must sum to one and, because there are constants in all the
relevant econometric equations, the expectation of ´ must be restricted to zero.
The fourteen parameter estimates along with their associated standard errors are pre-
sented in the section entitled \Error distributions." It is clear that the distribution of ´
is non-normal. There is a large probability mass near zero. The ¯fth and sixth points of
support account for about 98% of the probability mass, and they are relatively close to zero,
at -0.093 and 0.336. The asymmetry in ´'s distribution is striking even looking only at these
two \middle" points of support. If the distribution of ´ were to be approximating a normal,
we would expect to see the two middle points of support having roughly equal probability
weight and lying roughly an equal distance from the origin. By contrast, the ¯fth point of
support lies at -0.093 with a probability of 0.644 while the sixth lies at 0.336 (more than
three times as far from the origin) with a probability of 0.336 (less than half the mass as on
the ¯fth). None of the other points of support has even 1% probability on it. In addition
to this, ´ has a very long left tail, with its lowest point at -4.845 and its highest at 1.563.
Additionally, we calculated the skewness statistic for the distribution of ´. It is -6.43 (and
29highly signi¯cant), cementing the case for non-normality.
In addition to being non-normal, ´ is substantively relevant. Consider that the error
term in the quantity equation is ºQ + ´. The variance of ºQ is estimated to be 0.236 while
the variance of ´ is estimated to be 0.241. Thus, ´ accounts for about half of the variance
in the quantity equation (recall that we assume that ºQ and ´ are independent). The error
term in the entry equation is º¦ + r´. The variance of º¦ is estimated at 0.372 while the
variance of r´ is estimated at 0.013. So, ´ accounts for a modest 3.4% of the variance in the
entry equation. This sharp contrast is due to the small estimated value of r, at 0.23.
Since we know that ´ enters the quantity equation directly (i.e. with a coe±cient of
one), and since the log of quantity enters the entry equation linearly, the estimate of 0.23
for r means that ´ must enter either the average variable pro¯t equation negatively or the
¯xed cost equation positively.22 Let's consider the former and think about what kind of
unobserved heterogeneity ´ represents. If it were to represent unobserved heterogeneity in
demand alone, we should expect it to enter the average variable pro¯t equation with the
same sign it enters the demand equation | that is, high demand markets should also have
high (or at least the same) average variable pro¯ts. In contrast, if ´ represents unobserved
heterogeneity in the toughness of price competition, it should enter average variable pro¯ts
and quantity with opposite signs: markets with tougher competition should have higher
quantity and lower average variable pro¯ts. Obviously, both types of heterogeneity could be
operating. Since ´ seems to be entering average variable pro¯ts with a negative sign (since
r < 1), the latter e®ect seems to dominate here. That is, it appears that there is important
heterogeneity in the toughness of price competition among markets.
The discrete factor approximation is also of substantial econometric signi¯cance. By
adding the discrete factor approximation and the associated thirteen parameters (twelve
22Recall that ²¦ = ²Q + ²V ¡ ²F and that ²Q = ºQ + ´ and ²¦ = º¦ + r´.
30for the discrete factor approximation and one for r), the log likelihood in the model rises
from about -589 to -467. There is also a large di®erence in the estimates. The estimates in
columns three and four of Table 4 and the estimates in the ¯nal two columns of Table 5 do
not take account of correlation between the error terms in the entry and quantity equations,
i.e. they do not take account of endogenous entry. All three of these speci¯cations yield
larger estimates of the e®ect of entry on quantity than does the main estimation, which
takes account of endogenous entry. For example, compare the estimated e®ect of the entry
of a second ¯rm from the main estimation (±2) with estimates that do not account for
endogenous entry. The estimate from the main estimation (column 2 of Table 5) is 0.25.
The estimate in column 4 (No DFA), which does not account for endogeneity, is 0.46. The
estimates for the entry of a second ¯rm from the single equation model (Table 4) are 0.48
and 0.62. Ignoring the endogeneity of entry in the quantity equation leads to overestimating
the demand-increasing e®ects of entry and competition by the second ¯rm by about 100%.
4.1 Ratios and Competition
Table 6 contains the estimated per-¯rm population thresholds for a hypothetical market with
all covariates at their mean values. We report per-¯rm entry threshold ratios in Table 7, along
with their standard errors.23 The ¯rst two columns of Table 7 display the threshold ratios
for the simple ordered probit model presented in Table 4. The third and fourth columns
contain the threshold ratios from the full model of Table 5.
Since both the ordered probit and the full model provide consistent estimators of ±N ¡
®N ¡ °N, the threshold ratios implied by these two models should be nearly identical, and
they are. Recall that the simple ordered probit model is an estimate of equation 15, the
¯rst equation of the model. Single equation estimates of this equation are consistent. The
23Here and elsewhere, standard errors for non-linear transformations of the parameters are calculated via
the delta method.
31disadvantage of the simple ordered probit is that it is not able to distinguish between ±, ®,
and °. But for purposes of calculating threshold ratios there is no need to distinguish among
these parameters, as can be seen from equation 19.
The estimates in Table 7 show that the second ¯rm requires about twice the per-¯rm
population as does the ¯rst ¯rm. The third ¯rm requires about 40% more per-¯rm population
than does the second, and the fourth ¯rm requires about the same per-¯rm population as
does the third. The di®erences between the threshold ratios for the 2/1 entry and the 2/3
entry are statistically signi¯cant at 5%, as are the di®erences between the 2/1 and 3/4 ratios.
The di®erences between the 2/3 and 3/4 ratios are not signi¯cant, and the 3/4 ratio is not
signi¯cantly di®erent from 1.
Assuming that ¯xed costs are constant in N, these point estimates show that the tough-
ness of competition is no longer changing with entry after the third ¯rm enters. If we
interpret unchanging toughness of competition as the achievement of competitive results,
then we conclude that three ¯rms is enough to achieve a competitive market.
We explore this pattern further by using the information on the demand equation. Note
that we must assume that ¯xed costs are unchanging in N in order to make inferences from
the threshold ratios alone about changes in the toughness of price competition. The results
in Table 7 by themselves could result from ¯xed costs rising with N at a decreasing rate
without any change in competitive conditions.
The quantity results help to dispel this possibility. In Table 8 the threshold ratios are
decomposed into a per-capita demand e®ect and a variable pro¯ts and ¯xed cost e®ect.
The per-capita demand contribution to the 2/1 threshold is 0.77. This means that, were
variable pro¯ts and ¯xed costs to remain the same when the second ¯rm enters, so that only
per-capita demand changes with entry, the second ¯rm would require only 77% the per-¯rm
market size that the ¯rst ¯rm did. This is another way of saying that per-capita demand
rises by about 23% with the entry of the second ¯rm. Similarly, the ratio of ¯xed costs to
32variable pro¯ts rises by a factor of 2.54 with the entry of the second ¯rm. The product of
these two numbers yields the overall 2/1 threshold ratio from Table 7 of 1.95.
5 Discussion
Taken together, the entry and quantity results indicate that entry by the second ¯rm both
increases quantity and decreases average variable pro¯ts as a fraction of ¯xed costs. A
reduction in price would do this. Similarly, the entry of the third ¯rm increases quantity and
reduces the ratio of average variable pro¯ts to ¯xed costs, which would also happen if a price
decrease occurred. Both of these e®ects are statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels
(see Table 5). The entry of the fourth ¯rm, however, leads to a non-signi¯cant decline in
demand and a non-signi¯cant increase in the ratio of average variable pro¯ts to ¯xed costs.
The importance of ´ demonstrates that there is signi¯cant inter-market heterogeneity
which leads the market structure dummies to be endogenous. In addition, the fact that r
is signi¯cantly less that one likely indicates that the toughness of price competition varies
considerably among markets.
The model we use to structure our analysis makes several strong assumptions about the
nature of competition in the markets we analyze. It assumes that we have properly de¯ned
the geographic market. It assumes that the ¯rms play a game resulting in a symmetric
equilibrium. These assumptions are not likely to be literally true for hospital markets, so we
now turn to a discussion of potential problems, how we attempt to mitigate them, and what
e®ects these problems might have on our estimates.
A long and voluminous line of research demonstrates that there is very substantial geo-
graphic di®erentiation among hospitals (see Capps et al., 2003; Gaynor and Vogt, 2003, 2000,
and references therein). As we mentioned previously, our strategy in de¯ning markets was
designed to minimize this kind of di®erentiation. The hospitals in a market are all within
33¯ve miles of each other and are separated from other hospitals by at least 15 miles.
In addition to geographic factors, hospitals have a variety of sizes, levels of technological
sophistication, and reputation, and prior work demonstrates both that these factors in°uence
demand and that the in°uence is di®erent for di®erent types of patients (Capps et al., 2003;
Gaynor and Vogt, 2003, 2000, and references therein).
If these additional dimensions of di®erentiation are also important to demanders, then
inference about the e®ects of entry is less clear. In di®erentiated products models, entry of
a new ¯rm can a®ect quantity both through its e®ect on price and by increasing product
diversity. If entry is consumer welfare enhancing, then quantity will increase. If entry does
not enhance consumer welfare, then quantity will not increase. As a consequence, if the
product is di®erentiated, we may be able to make inferences about whether entry leads to
consumer welfare enhancing changes in competition, but we will not be able infer the precise
nature of the competitive mechanism.
With a di®erentiated product, however, it is possible that we may be overstating or
understating the e®ects of entry on competition. It is likely that in a di®erentiated product
model a ¯rst entrant will position itself in the most pro¯table niche, with later entrants
¯lling in progressively less attractive niches. This could generate a generally declining entry
threshold ratio pattern even in the absence of competitive e®ects, depending on the relative
pro¯tability of the niches. As Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) point out, it is very di±cult to
rule out product di®erentiation, especially along di±cult to observe lines, as an explanation
for the changing threshold ratios. However, as they also point out, one would not expect the
ratios to converge to one with entry in the presence of product di®erentiation.
Previous work has detected e®ects of product di®erentiation on entry thresholds from
within the BR framework. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) analyzed, among other markets, the
market for new car dealers. They found that the per-¯rm threshold ratio for the fourth ¯rm
was substantially above one and interpreted this as being generated by product di®erentiation
34among the dealers: the fourth entrant was usually a second GM dealership and was also the
¯rst intra-brand competitor. In a similar vein, Dranove et al. (2003) show in their analysis of
HMO markets that the entry of successive HMOs into di®erent market niches generates a non-
monotonic relationship between the number of entrants and the entry threshold ratios. By
contrast, in our work the entry threshold ratios have exhibited a monotonic relationship with
entry, and have robustly converged to around one by four entrants.24 Thus the patterns we
¯nd are not consistent with a hypothesis that entry leads to increased product di®erentiation
with no increase in competition.
Another important assumption of the entry model is equal division of the market among
the entrants. We examine how close to equal division our markets come. In Table 9, we
show the distribution of the spread of bed sizes in our markets.25 The ¯rst few rows show
the distribution of our raw dispersion measure, the number of beds in the biggest hospital
in the market minus the number of beds in the smallest hospital in the market, divided by
the total number of beds in the market. As is readily apparent, there is a non-trivial ex post
di®erence in the output among hospitals in our markets. In the median duopoly market, the
smaller hospital is smaller than the larger by 20% of the total beds in the market. In the
median triopoly, the median bed spread is 0.25 and in four hospital markets, it is 0.33.
If ¯rms know before entering whether they are going to be large or small and if the
smaller ¯rms are not able to command higher prices (as seems likely in this industry), then
destined-to-be-small ¯rms, who will receive less than 1
N of market quantity, will presumably
enter after the destined-to-be-big ¯rms and will require a larger population increment to
induce them to enter. While this could potentially explain the increasing per-¯rm thresholds
we estimate, it can not explain the increasing per-capita demand. Furthermore, we do not
24In some earlier drafts of this paper, even three ¯rms appeared to be enough to generate a unit entry
threshold ratio.
25As we indicated in Section 3, capacity is highly correlated with other measures of hospital output.
35believe that it can explain the pattern of threshold ratios we see in our data.
To address this, consider the following. Modify equation 15 to allow for heterogeneous
¯rm sizes: simply replace 1
N by shareN. Then, assuming that conduct and ¯xed costs do





quantity N ¢shareN is the Nth ¯rm's share as a proportion of what its share would be under
equal division ( 1
N).
The second section of Table 9 contains information on the distribution of N times the
bed share of the smallest ¯rm in each of our non-monopoly markets. If ¯rms are of equal
size, this measure equals one. Further, it measures proportionately how much smaller the
smallest ¯rm is, compared to how large it would be under equal shares. The table says that
in the median duopoly market, the smaller ¯rm is 79% of the size (21% smaller) it would
be under equal shares. Similarly, in the median triopoly and four ¯rm markets the smallest
¯rms are 60% and 41% of the sizes they would be under equal division.
Having constructed these measures, now consider the hypothesis that all of the movement
in threshold ratios comes from size e®ects and that there is no e®ect of entry on competition.
Then, as we discuss above, the threshold ratios would be 1
0:79 = 1:27 for the 2=1 threshold,
0:79
0:60 = 1:32 for the 3=2 threshold, and 0:60
0:40 = 1:5 for the 4=3 threshold. These ratios increase in
N, whereas our estimates decrease. Furthermore, the di®erences among these thresholds are
small relative to the di®erences between our estimated thresholds. Thus, although the ¯rms
in our sample do have heterogeneous sizes, this heterogeneity does not change very much
with increasing N and, to the extent it does change, it changes in the opposite direction of
what would be necessary to explain away our entry threshold results.
366 Summary and Conclusions
The relationship between market structure and competition is central to industrial orga-
nization. In this paper we augment the empirical approach developed by Bresnahan and
Reiss for industries where there are good data available on quantity in addition to market
structure.
We use this approach to examine the relationship between market structure and compe-
tition in hospital markets. This approach is particularly valuable in examining competition
in these markets. Hospital prices are measured poorly in available data. As a consequence,
an approach to assessing competition which does not rely on price data is valuable. In addi-
tion, with our approach we are able to assess whether this competition is consumer welfare
increasing and pinpoint the e®ects of changes in the number of ¯rms in small markets, nei-
ther of which is possible from the earlier structure-conduct-performance based literature on
hospital competition.
We ¯nd evidence that entry leads to a signi¯cant increase in competition in the hospital
markets we examine. This corroborates the results from price-based studies of hospital
competition. In addition, we ¯nd that competition increases consumer welfare. Interestingly
enough, most of the e®ect on competition comes from the entry of a second and third hospital.
Subsequent entry has a much smaller estimated e®ect on competition.
Since the U.S. health care system is primarily market-based, e®ective competition in
these markets is critical. Antitrust authorities have opposed hospital mergers where they
have felt they would be anticompetitive. The courts in recent years have rejected these
attempts to block hospital mergers.
The policy prescription from our work is that the antitrust enforcement agencies should
be particularly concerned about merger to monopoly or duopoly in isolated, rural hospital
markets like the ones we analyze. This is relevant, since quite a few recent hospital mergers
37have had this character.
Three out of the 11 hospital merger cases that the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies
have brought in the last twenty years were in markets in our sample.26 The mergers in each
of these cases reduced the number of hospitals from 3 to 2. Our estimates imply substantial
reductions in competition from these mergers, and a reduction in consumer welfare. Our
estimates of the entry threshold ratios indicate that the third ¯rm in a market requires a
41% larger population per-¯rm to support it than does the second ¯rm (Table 6), implying
a substantial increase in competition due to the entry of a third ¯rm. Further, per-capita
demand increases about 15% due to the entry of a third ¯rm (Table 7), implying an increase
in consumer welfare. Some of the other cases have involved merger to monopoly.27 The
anticompetitive e®ects of such mergers could be even greater. Mergers that reduce the
number of hospitals from from four to three have, on average, lesser e®ects on competition.28
26Poplar Blu®, Missouri (FTC et al v. Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir,
1999)), Ukiah, California (Adventist Health System/West (117 FTC 23, 1994)), Dubuque, Iowa (U.S. v.
Mercy Health Services and Finley Tri-States Health Group, Inc. (902 F. Supp. 968, N.D. IO, 1995)). See
Gaynor and Vogt (2000) for more details.
27For example, Grand Rapids, Michigan (FTC vs. Butterworth Health Corporation and Blodgett Memorial
Medical Center (1996, 947 F. Supp. 1285)).
28Our results indicate that on average for the markets we study here, entry of a fourth ¯rm has little e®ect
on competition. Of course this is subject to the caveat that antitrust e®ects are speci¯c to the particulars of
a market. Thus a merger reducing the number of ¯rms from four to three could be anticompetitive for any
particular market.
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43Table 1: Sample Hospitals
Sample Hosps US Hosps
Beds Count Percent Count Percent
< 10 0 0.0 13 0.2
10- 25 1 0.2 307 5.6
26- 50 5 1.0 986 17.8
51-100 176 35.9 1213 21.9
101-200 195 39.8 1269 22.9
201-300 63 12.9 744 13.5
301-400 30 6.1 425 7.7
> 400 20 4.1 574 10.4
44Table 2: Market Structure and Population






45Table 3: Variable De¯nitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name De¯nition Mean Std Dev
Quantity Adjusted admissions, market (1000s) 5.50 7.82
Market population City population (100,000s) 0.20 0.20
Fringe population Non-city population within 15 miles (100,000s) 0.16 0.13
Commuters Proportion commuting 45+ min to work 0.06 0.03
Proportion 65+ Proportion of city population age 65+ 0.17 0.05
# HMOs # HMOs in county 0.96 1.56
Per-capita income City per-capita income ($1000s) 10.77 2.21
CON Dummy for state certi¯cate of need law 0.56
Wage index CMS wage index (base=1) 0.80 0.08
Rent City median gross rent ($1000s) 0.31 0.07
Construction cost Adjusted CMS construction cost index (base=1) 0.88 0.10
Distance!big Distance to place with pop. > 100K (100s miles) 1.02 0.15
Distance!small Distance to place with pop. > 5K (100s miles) 0.29 0.15
Military base Dummy for military base > 500 employees 0.04
46Table 4: Single equation estimates
N lnQ lnQ



































































47Table 4: Single equation estimates
N lnQ lnQ





























48Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Full Model No DFA
Parameter Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
Market Size, ¸
Market population 0.831 0.039 0.710 0.051
Fringe population 0.212 0.021 0.173 0.025
Military base 0.046 0.062 0.093 0.070
Per Capita Quantity, ±
constant 8.342 0.035 8.380 2.735
Wage index -0.241 0.235 -0.086 0.329
Rent -0.161 0.137 -0.275 0.199
Income per capita 0.376 0.118 0.379 0.181
Number of HMOs -0.012 0.013 -0.019 0.017
Proportion 65+ 0.019 0.070 0.140 0.097
Commuters -0.041 0.032 -0.043 0.050
Distance ! big -0.002 0.047 -0.071 0.068
Distance ! small 0.215 0.051 0.108 0.074
±2 0.254 0.059 0.463 0.083
±3 0.415 0.130 0.201 0.176
±4 0.297 0.152 -0.110 0.264
49Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Full Model No DFA
Parameter Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
Variable Pro¯ts: demand shifters, ®X
Income per capita -0.254 0.209 -0.271 0.236
Number of HMOs -0.006 0.020 0.024 0.021
Proportion 65+ 0.134 0.103 0.140 0.116
Commuters -0.054 0.055 -0.038 0.064
Distance ! big -0.005 0.074 0.056 0.084
Distance ! small 0.053 0.075 0.103 0.087
Fixed Costs: °W
Construction cost -0.315 0.270 -0.278 0.229
CON 0.027 0.047 0.017 0.041
Variable Pro¯ts & Fixed costs:
Cost shifters, °W ¡ ®W
constant 7.997 0.046 8.084 0.044
Wage index 0.977 0.438 0.947 0.466
Rent 0.110 0.227 -0.024 0.254
Entry e®ects: °N ¡ ®N
°2 ¡ ®2 0.871 0.077 1.578 0.093
°3 ¡ ®3 1.344 0.156 0.817 0.192
°4 ¡ ®4 1.251 0.186 -0.110 0.264
50Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Full Model No DFA
















¾º¦ 0.372 0.027 0.325 0.030
¾ºQ 0.236 0.017 0.455 0.016
r 0.230 0.073
V (´) 0.241 0.125
V (r´) 0.013 0.011
Number of Observations 613 613
51Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Full Model No DFA
Parameter Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
Log-Likelihood -467.29 -588.84
52Table 6: Per-Firm Population Thresholds





53Table 7: Threshold Ratios
Ratio Ordered Probit Full Model
Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
s2=s1 1.97 0.12 1.95 0.12
s3=s2 1.44 0.13 1.41 0.12
s4=s3 1.06 0.12 1.04 0.11
54Table 8: Threshold Ratios' Decomposition
Component 2/1 3/2 4+/3
Per-Capita Q dN+1=dN 0.77 0.85 1.13




FN 2.54 1.66 0.92
Overall sN+1=sN 1.95 1.41 1.04
55Table 9: Size dispersion within markets
Percentile 2 hospitals 3 hospitals 4 hospitals
Spread of beds
10th 0.05 0.10 0.21
25th 0.09 0.17 0.24
median 0.21 0.25 0.33
75th 0.38 0.38 0.45
90th 0.60 0.49 0.52
N times share of smallest
10th 0.43 0.29 0.32
25th 0.62 0.46 0.35
median 0.79 0.60 0.41
75th 0.91 0.76 0.56
90th 0.95 0.89 0.69
Number of Markets 49 8 4
56Figure 1: Geographical Distribution of Hospital Markets
57